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GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER? ABOLITION
OF THE EAGAN RULE IN WYOMING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE/MURDER CASES
Stewart M. Young*
Abstract
This article argues that specific Wyoming jury instructions arising from the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Eagan v. State are inappropriate because
they force the jury to accept a defendant’s testimony. Specifically, defense counsel
often request such instructions in murder cases (and, more importantly, domestic
violence murder cases) when the defendant is the sole witness testifying about the
events of the alleged murder. The Eagan rule requires the jury to “accept as true”
the events testified to by the defendant if the defendant is the only witness to the
crime and if the testimony is not impeached or found improbable.
Such an instruction, essentially removing a key determination by the jury, is
surprising. This article examines the genesis of the instruction and the historical
limitations the Wyoming Supreme Court placed on the instruction, while still
keeping it on the books to this day. Further this article contends that, considering
that other states do not use this type of instruction and given that the pattern
instructions are much more useful, the Eagan rule should be abolished in
Wyoming. Finally, this article argues the instruction is inconsistent with U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as jurisprudence of the states upon which
the Wyoming Supreme Court relied when it installed the Eagan rule in the first
place. Following this article is an appendix discussing each case in Wyoming that
has dealt with the Eagan rule.
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, University of
Wyoming College of Law. A.B., Princeton University, M.A., Waseda University, J.D., Stanford Law
School. I appreciate the terrific assistance and editing of the Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board.
The idea for this article arose out of my argument in Benjamin v. State before the Wyoming Supreme
Court in April 2011. 264 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2011). I appreciate the generous support of the Dyekman
Law Faculty Research Fund in the writing of this article.
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I. Introduction
Over the past fifty years, the Wyoming Supreme Court developed a surprising
rule regarding the testimony of a defendant accused of committing murder. The
Eagan rule, as set forth in Eagan v. State,1 is a jury instruction that requires the jury
to accept the defendant’s version of testimony if that testimony is not impeached
or shown to be improbable. Such a rule wholly invades the province of the jury,
whose task it is to determine how much weight to give the testimony of each
witness. The Eagan rule thus requires the jury to accept a defendant’s testimony
as true, regardless of motive, manner of testifying, or other factors. Such a rule
is not the norm in other states, nor does the rule appear to have a sound basis in
Wyoming precedent. This article argues that the Eagan rule should not be the rule
in Wyoming and specifically calls upon the legislature and the Wyoming Supreme
Court to abolish this rule because it is an improper jury instruction.

II. Eagan v. State: The Genesis of the Eagan Rule
On December 11, 1940, Dan Eagan killed his wife, Catherine, in a basement
apartment owned by his mother in Casper, Wyoming.2 While the county
prosecutor charged Eagan with committing first-degree murder, Eagan claimed
that he killed Catherine in an “accidental shooting” and a jury subsequently
1

128 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1942).

2

Id. at 216.
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convicted him of the lesser charge of second-degree murder.3 Eagan appealed his
conviction, claiming that the jury should have credited his defense.
The case hinged on Eagan’s statements regarding the night he killed his wife.
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted initially that Eagan was a practicing attorney
in Casper.4 Eagan testified that on December 11, 1940, he worked at the office
during the day and then left to the Elks Club for about a half an hour.5 There, he
met his mother, took her to a nearby hotel, and then returned to the Elks Club.6
While at the club, his wife called and asked him to bring home some beer, which
he did (along with a pint of whiskey).7 Once at home, he had dinner with his wife,
his daughter, and the maid, and then “went to his work-shop in the basement to
work on a gun-stock.”8 Specifically, he owned ten or fifteen firearms, and he had
a familiarity with these firearms given that he often repaired and cared for them.9
At this point, Eagan’s testimony turned to the shooting. After finishing the
dishes, his wife “came into the work-room, sat on a bench, and talked with him
for a time in an apparently amiable conversation.”10 His wife left to take care
of their daughter and then returned several times to chat with Eagan.11 Finally,
Eagan went to their bedroom (after consuming the pint of whiskey with his wife)
and brought a revolver and three shells with him12 because:
[T]he gun had not been working properly and I had figured
all summer that I would fix it, and then, due to one thing and
another, I had not gotten around to it, and I had just started on
my winter’s work, and I picked it up along with the shells, with
the idea of seeing if I could find out what was wrong with it.13
Once in the bedroom, Eagan loaded the gun as he sat down in an easy chair.14
His wife then came into the room, and while they talked, he examined the gun,
“manipulating its mechanism” as she lay down by the fireplace.15 She soon moved
3

Id. at 217.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 218.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.
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to an ottoman in front of Eagan, facing away from him and towards the radio in
the room.16 Eagan continued to handle the gun “to see how it was centering . . .
[and] see down there to see the shine of that cap to see if it was on center . . . and
as I worked to bring it around here in the light, it went off.”17 It did not just go
“off,” however. Eagan explained: “When I cocked the gun, I pulled the hammer
back, and at the same time I did so I pulled the trigger back . . . . I don’t know
how the gun happened to fire. It all happened so quickly, and, like any accident,
it just went off.”18
Testimony at trial demonstrated the bullet struck Catherine in the neck,
lacerating her spinal cord and emerging out the right side.19 After being shot,
Catherine “toppled over.”20 She was still alive when the doctor arrived, but died
shortly thereafter.21 Officers testified that Eagan told them “the damn thing . . .
got away from him.”22
The prosecutor charged Eagan with first-degree murder; and one might
ask why, given that up to this point there did not seem to be any evidence of
premeditation or planning.23 Such testimony came in later, as the State introduced
evidence “to show the conduct of the defendant toward the deceased” on other
occasions.24 The State introduced testimony demonstrating that Eagan had on
a previous occasion “struck his wife on the head with his hand, and later kicked
the back of [her] seat of the car several times . . . so that it knocked her against
the windshield and the dashboard.”25 On another occasion, Eagan purportedly
kicked Catherine in the shin, poured beer on her, and even “put his hands on
the neck of the deceased, as to choke her, and shook her.”26 He also threatened to
knock her down on two other occasions while asking her: “How would you like
a nice fresh divorce for Christmas?”27 The Eagan’s maid also testified, stating that
the husband and wife were not on speaking terms for two or three weeks at one
point and that there were numerous arguments and fights.28
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 219.

20

Id. at 218.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 219.

“Whoever purposefully and with premeditated malice . . . kills any human being is guilty
of murder in the first degree.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (1940). The elements for first degree
murder have not changed materially between the decision in Eagan and the present.
23

24

Eagan, 128 P.2d at 219.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 220.

27

Id.

28

Id.
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The evidence against Eagan was not all bad, however. For instance, when the
doctor arrived to tend to Catherine, Eagan “was kneeling beside the deceased and
begg[ing] her to open her eyes.”29 The coroner who also arrived shortly after the
shooting testified that Eagan “was greatly shocked.”30 Further, Eagan then tried
to kill himself, but police officers and the coroner prevented him from doing so.31
After calming down, he answered questions for the officers (that varied slightly to
the questions posed by the prosecuting attorney on that same night), but the gist
was that “‘the damn thing’ (the gun) got away from him.”32
After his conviction, Eagan requested the Wyoming Supreme Court overturn
his conviction arguing that the State failed to demonstrate malice.33 Citing
a number of out-of-state cases,34 the court held that the jury should accept a
defendant’s testimony as true, as long as the facts and circumstances (and the
defendant’s testimony) met certain caveats.35 Hence, the Eagan rule, as outlined
in this case, required:
Where an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as
a crime, as in the case at bar, his testimony cannot be arbitrarily
rejected, and if his credibility has not been impeached, and his
testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent
therewith, then his testimony should be accepted.36
After citing a number of cases, the court discussed eight of them in detail.37
The cases cited by the court do not necessarily lead to the development of the
29

Id. at 218.

30

Id. at 219.

31

Id.

32

Id. (quotations in original).

33

Id. at 225.

McHugh v. State, 3 So. 2d 572 (Ala. 1941); McDowell v. State, 191 So. 894 (Ala. 1939);
Russell v. State, 107 So. 922 (Fl. 1926); Holton v. State, 99 So. 244 (Fl. 1924); Miller v. State, 191
S.E. 115 (Ga. 1937); Surles v. State, 97 S.E. 538 (Ga. 1918); Green v. State, 52 S.E. 431 (Ga. 1905);
Owens v. State, 48 S.E. 21 (Ga. 1904); Futch v. State, 16 S.E. 102 (Ga. 1892); Wall v. State, 63 S.E.
27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908); Frazier v. Comm., 114 S.W. 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908); Bowen v. State, 144
So. 230 (Miss. 1932); Martin v. State, 106 So. 270 (Miss. 1925); Patty v. State, 88 So. 498 (Miss.
1921); Houston v. State, 78 So. 182 (Miss. 1918); Fairfax v. Comm., 13 S.E. 2d 315 (Va. 1941);
Thomason v. Comm., 17 S.E. 2d 374 (Va. 1941); Hawkins v. Comm., 169 S.E. 558 (Va. 1933);
Spratley v. Comm., 152 S.E. 362 (Va. 1930); State v. Hurst, 116 S.E. 248 (W.Va. 1923); State v.
Galford, 105 S.E. 237 (W.Va. 1920); Miller v. State, 211 N.W. 278 (Wisc. 1926). The Court also
cites two Philippine cases (as federal cases), United States v. Salamat, 36 Philippine 842 and United
States v. Dinola, 37 Philippine 797. My research has not uncovered these two federal cases.
34

35

Eagan, 128 P.2d at 225–26.

36

Id. at 226.

These eight cases include: Patty, Bowen, Spratley, Houston, Dinola, McDowell, Martin, and
Miller. See supra note 34 for citations.
37
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Eagan rule. For instance, in Spratley v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme
Court specifically acknowledged that the jury is required to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and assess the weight it may give to testimony.38 That
court mentioned, however, that the jury “may not arbitrarily or without any
justification therefor [sic] give no weight to material evidence . . . or refuse to
credit the uncontradicted testimony of a witness . . . .”39 Such a statement is a far
cry from Eagan’s announcement that the testimony “should be accepted.”40
In Houston v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged “‘the jury
is under no compulsion to implicitly believe all the statements of a party’ . . .
[but] testimony, unless materially contradicted by the physical facts, should not
be utterly ignored.”41 Again, there is a material difference between ensuring that
the jury does not utterly ignore testimony by a defendant, and forcing the jury to
accept the testimony as true.
McDowell v. State, another case remarked upon by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Eagan, clearly demonstrates the same distinction and demonstrates the
wide gulf between Eagan’s pronouncement and the out-of-state cases Eagan cites.
In McDowell, the Alabama Supreme Court stated the law permitting a defendant
and his wife to testify on his behalf “is a recognition of the fact that their testimony
can not be capriciously disregarded because of interest in the result.”42 Clearly, the
Eagan court went too far, declaring that the jury should accept rather than just not
capriciously disregard testimony as the McDowell court acknowledged.
In justifying the Eagan rule, the Wyoming Supreme Court failed to look at its
own precedent, and used out-of-state cases that in actuality did not comport with
the pronouncements of the Eagan rule. Whereas Eagan requires a jury to accept a
defendant’s statement as true, the out-of-state cases discussed above merely require
that the jury not ignore a defendant’s testimony or discredit it because a defendant
has an interest in the outcome of the case. Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court
used these out-of-state cases to justify a rule that does not appear to have a sound
basis in the precedent discussed in the Eagan opinion.

III. Subsequent Cases Applying the Eagan Rule in Wyoming
After Eagan, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the Eagan rule to only a
handful of cases.43 The court first applied the Eagan rule twelve years later in State
38

Spratley, 152 S.E. at 365.

39

Id.

40

Eagan, 128 P.2d at 226.

41

78 So. 182, 183 (Miss. 1918) (quoting Wingo v. State, 45 So. 862, 863 (Miss. 1907)).

42

191 So. 894, 898 (Ala. 1939).

By my calculation, there appear to be five cases, not including Eagan. They are, in
chronological order: State v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1954); State v. Lindsay, 317 P.2d 506
43
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v. Helton in 1954.44 After Helton, the court applied the Eagan rule only four more
times: once in 1957, once in 1959, once in 1963, and finally for the last reported
time in 1977.45

A. State v. Helton
After the court decided Eagan, it took the court another twelve years before
it finally allowed application of the Eagan rule to a defendant in State v. Helton.
Like Eagan, Helton was another case of domestic violence. Helton killed her
husband in their kitchen by shooting him five times with a Smith & Wesson
.38 caliber revolver.46 Although the State charged her with first-degree murder,
the jury convicted her of murder in the second degree.47 The State introduced
photographs of the scene, transcript of testimony by Helton before her arrest at
the coroner’s inquest, along with thirty-two witnesses and thirty-eight exhibits.48
In Helton, the issue came down to whether the State could prove malice.49
Of course, the issue of malice, express or implied, is and must be relevant to the
homicide. As the court noted in Eagan: “If the facts and circumstances of the
homicide appear, malice is inferred, not from the use of a deadly weapon alone,
but from all of the facts and circumstances so shown.”50 Applying the Eagan rule
to the defendant’s testimony, the court held that “the jury had no right to convict
her of a greater crime than that of voluntary manslaughter” given her testimony.51

B. Martinez v. State
After a jury convicted Martinez of first-degree murder, the Wyoming
Supreme Court examined Martinez’ confession and applied the Eagan rule. First,
the court noted the correct platitude that exculpatory portions of a defendant’s
confession do not always merit belief by the jury.52 It then noted that the jury

(Wyo. 1957); Martinez v. State, 342 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1959); Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726 (Wyo.
1963); and Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977). See infra Appendix A, supra notes 129–67.
After 1977, defendants often requested the Eagan Rule, but the Wyoming Supreme Court had
instituted more strict standards for allowing such a jury instruction. See infra Appendix B, supra
notes 168–310.
44

276 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1954).

45

See supra note 43.

46

Helton, 276 P.2d at 435.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 441.

50

Id. at 441–42 (citing Eagan v. State, 128 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1942)).

51

Id. at 443.

52

Martinez v. State, 342 P.2d 227, 338 (Wyo. 1959).
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should consider any admission of homicide along with mitigating or exculpatory
evidence.53 Finding evidence of premeditation lacking, the court ordered the trial
court to resentence Martinez to second-degree murder based on application of the
Eagan rule.54
These cases demonstrate that the Wyoming Supreme Court actually sought
to further develop, and in the case of Martinez, even extend the Eagan rule. It is
surprising that a court would require a jury to accept self-serving evidence, and
the Wyoming Supreme Court’s statement that a “jury has no right to convict”
a defendant based on that defendant’s testimony flies in the face of normal
confrontation jurisprudence. The court rightly narrowed the Eagan rule in
subsequent cases, but failed to eliminate it altogether.

IV. A Look at the Structure and Narrowing
of the Eagan Rule in Wyoming
While the court applied the Eagan rule in several instances, the Wyoming
Supreme Court also provided a number of cases that narrowed the application of
the Eagan rule. This section addresses the structure of the Eagan rule and how the
court narrowed it over time.

A. Searles v. State
In Searles v. State, the county prosecutor charged Searles with second-degree
murder in the shooting of a tenant, upon which the jury convicted Searles of
manslaughter.55 The tenant-victim, Ralph Cardwell, rented an apartment from
Searles’ family and began forcing himself on Searles, even torturing her on several
occasions.56 After Searles’ husband gave the tenant-victim notice to move out of
the apartment, Searles bought a gun.57 Several days later Searles shot the victim
while she and another person attempted to change a light bulb outside of the
tenant-victim’s apartment.58 As the crime took place, several witnesses either
watched the shooting or were nearby the area.59
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted: “[I]n order to justify the so-called Eagan
instruction, the defendant must be the Sole witness to the events formulating a
complete offense, and the defendant’s testimony must not be inconsistent with

53

Id.

54

Id. at 339.

55

589 P.2d 386, 388 (Wyo. 1979).

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 388–89.
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other facts and circumstances shown.”60 Accordingly, because the defendant was
not the only witness and several other witnesses testified about certain aspects of
what happened, the court held it was not error for the trial court to refuse giving
the Eagan instruction to the jury.61 Thus, the first caveat to applying the Eagan
rule to a defendant’s testimony is that the defendant must be the only person who
can testify to the events in question.

B. Cullin v. State
The Wyoming Supreme Court further curtailed the scope of the Eagan rule,
as evidenced by its holding in Cullin v. State.62 The court sought to limit the use of
the Eagan instruction unless the defendant fulfilled certain parameters.63 In Cullin,
the defendant’s testimony was inconsistent with the facts and circumstances of
the murder, and the defendant was not the only witness of the crime.64 Indeed,
according to the court, there “were many witnesses to the bits and pieces forming a
complete offense the foundation of the circumstantial evidence case.”65 Thus, the
court held that the Eagan rule would not have been a proper instruction, especially
given the facts and circumstances surrounding the murder did not mesh with
the defendant’s testimony. Cullin, therefore, demonstrated that inconsistencies
compared with the testimony of a defendant negate the defendant’s ability to
request and receive the Eagan rule.

C. Doe v. State
In Doe v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to apply the Eagan rule
to negate the jury’s finding of intent and malice.66 Rather, according to the court,
the State provided “other evidence tending to discredit [Doe’s] story, which, in
combination with the entrance-wound location, would be sufficient to give rise to
such inference [of malice].”67 The court noted that medical testimony regarding
the victim’s body countered Doe’s own testimony and therefore impeached her.68
Such medical testimony clearly contradicted Doe’s claim that she shot the victim
while he was facing her, but instead demonstrated that the victim turned his head
as she shot him and that he then fell backwards out of the door.69 Another witness
60

Id. at 390 (citing Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 4445, 452–53 (Wyo. 1977)).

61

Id.

62

565 P.2d 445, 452 (Wyo. 1977).

63

Id. (citing Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977)).

64

Id.

65

Id. at 453.

66

569 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1977).

67

Id. at 1279–80.

68

Id. at 1280.

69

Id. at 1278.
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testified that he saw the victim “come out of the door face-forward and fall behind
another car.”70 Additionally, the court noted evidence of Doe’s lack of remorse
regarding the shooting, as well as evidence of her “propensity to react violently in
a retaliatory fashion.” 71
Thus, the medical testimony and physical observations by other witnesses
clearly demonstrated problems with Doe’s story and properly led to the court
excluding the Eagan rule from consideration by the jury. Accordingly, the court
found that the medical testimony and other witnesses had impeached Doe’s
version of the shooting, and therefore, the jury could infer malice from the facts
provided by the State.72 For that reason, the Wyoming Supreme Court held the
Eagan rule did not apply in this case, and the trial court appropriately denied
Doe’s request for the rule.

V. Discussion
Based on the cases discussed above, application of the Eagan rule is rather
straightforward in the event that the court finds the rule applies to a defendant’s
testimony. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, when the trial court
applies the rule, the jury should accept the defendant’s version of a homicide, or
the trial court should accept that version despite the jury’s clear verdict against
the defendant.73 There are caveats to proper application of the Eagan rule at
trial, however. The Wyoming Supreme Court also requires the trial court to
mine the record to ensure that the Eagan rule is only applied in the strictest
of circumstances.74 And, when “the conditions of the Eagan instruction are
not met, there is no mandatory requirement that the defendant’s statements be
accepted.”75 The Wyoming Supreme Court has also held the Eagan instruction
is allowed in cases wherein other evidence does not contradict the defendant’s
explanation, either in a direct or inferential manner.76 If the defendant’s testimony
is uncontradicted, the jury is required to accept the defendant’s self-serving
statement as a disclosure of the true facts of the case.77 Ultimately, “Eagan states
that upon the fulfillment of certain conditions the jury is limited in its role as sole
judge of a witness’s credibility and the accused’s testimony must be accepted.” 78

70

Id.

71

Id. at 1280.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 1279.

74

Id.

75

Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1202 (Wyo. 1977).

76

Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 453 (Wyo. 1977).

77

Id.

78

Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1016 (Wyo. 1977).
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A defendant’s testimony is something unique to the criminal justice system,
given that a bedrock principle of the criminal system is: “No person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 79 While this
presumption against compelled testimony is grounded in the Bill of Rights, earlier
English courts had a different view of defendant testimony. As such, in English
common law, “the criminal courts of the period lacked the authority to require a
defendant to take an oath, and defendants were not even permitted to testify.” 80
Dressler and Thomas, experts in the field of criminal procedure, note further:
“The common law disability of defendants to testify was a rule of evidence based
on the presumed bias of the defendant . . . .” 81 Finally, in 1892, that common-law
disability of not allowing a defendant to testify on his own behalf was removed by
statute in federal courts and by almost all state courts.82
Jeffrey Bellin, an expert in criminal justice, argues that the criminal justice
system should incentivize defendants to testify, and that there is no clear incentive
to the system to have defendants not testify.83 In his article, Bellin notes, “the
standard instructions with respect to a defendant’s testimony undercut the
default position of the testifying defendant.”84 He describes certain instructions
that specifically discuss the defendant’s deep personal interest and that such
instructions mention that this interest has the potential to create a motive for
false testimony.85 While this instruction appears to be in the minority, he explains
that other courts “support an alternative instruction that a proper consideration
in evaluating the defendant’s testimony, like that of any witness, is the defendant’s
interest, bias, or prejudice.”86
It is clear that historically, the court presumed and recognized the bias of a
defendant. Indeed, given this bias, scholars such as Bellin have sought to change
the structure or parameters of trial in order to incentivize the defendant to testify
(in order to improve the truth-seeking function of the trial courts). What is also
clear, however, is that the Eagan rule is an alteration of the normal rules that
apply for all witnesses. A close look at the criminal pattern jury instructions,
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and even the Wyoming Supreme Court’s own
precedent, stress the point that all witness credibility must be judged and decided
by the jury.
79

U.S. Const. amend. V.

Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas III, Criminal Procedure: Principles, Policies
Perspectives 575 (4th ed., West 2010).
80

and

81

Id.

82

Id. at 576.

Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage
Defendants to Testify, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 851, 853 (2008).
83

84

Id. at 876.

85

Id. at 877.

86

Id. (quotations omitted).
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A. Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
The criminal pattern jury instructions for a number of jurisdictions make
clear the jury is to determine the credibility of the defendant’s testimony in a
similar manner to all of the other witnesses at trial. For instance, the Wyoming
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions does not even include the Eagan rule. Instead, it
includes only instructions on the credibility of witnesses generally and credibility
of the defendant if he or she testifies.87 Instruction No. 1.02 informs the jury:
[I]t is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh and consider all
evidence which is presented to it; to determine the credibility of
all witnesses and evidence, to determine the issues of fact.
....
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses
and of the weight to be given their testimony. In so doing, you
may take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in
the case, and give to each such weight as in the light of your
experience and knowledge of human affairs you think it entitled.
In judging the credibility of the witnesses in this case, you
should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness
stand, their apparent degree of intelligence, their means of
knowledge of the facts testified to, their interest, if any, in the
outcome of this trial, and their revealed motives or prejudice or
feelings of revenge, if any have been shown by the evidence in
this case.
[Y]ou may consider the evidence presented to you and the
reasonable inferences and conclusions that may be drawn there
from in the light of your knowledge, observation and experience
in the affairs of life.88
Additionally, Instruction No. 1.04A on “When the Defendant Testifies” states:
The jury is instructed that one accused and on trial charged
with the commission of a crime may testify or not, as he pleases.
When a Defendant does testify, you have no right to disregard his

87

Wyo. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr., Instr. Nos. 1.02, 1.02A, and 1.04A (2009).

Id. at No. 1.02. Instruction No. 1.02A is quite similar to No. 1.02 for the purpose of
this analysis.
88
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testimony merely because he is accused of a crime; that when he
does testify, his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the
same test and scrutiny as are legally applied to any other witness.89
Thus, the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Instructions clearly demonstrate that
credibility of the defendant is subject to the same “test and scrutiny” as other
witnesses. While Instruction No. 1.04A notes that the jury should not immediately
disregard the testimony of the defendant just because the witness is the defendant,
the instruction still requests the jury apply the same standards the jury applies to
any other witness. Such an instruction is appropriate: the standards the jury sets
for each witness should apply to each witness, no more and no less.
The Federal Jury Practice and Instructions also follows this same pattern
for determination of the credibility of the defendant when he or she deems it
necessary to testify. Those instructions generally outline the usual “Credibility of
Witnesses” jury instruction.90 The instruction reads, in relevant part:
You, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility
of each of the witnesses called to testify in this case and only
you determine the importance or the weight, if any, that their
testimony deserves. After making your assessment concerning
the credibility of a witness, you may decide to believe all of that
witness’ testimony, only a portion of it, or none of it.91
Indeed, the instruction continues by charging the jury to “[c]onsider each
witness’s intelligence, motive to falsify, state of mind, and appearance and manner
while on the witness stand.”92 Furthermore, the instruction calls upon the jury
to consider “the manner in which each witness might be affected by your verdict,
and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted
by other evidence in the case.”93 Finally, the general instruction calls upon the

Id. at No. 1.04A. The Use Note (2009) explains: “This instruction should be given only
upon the request of the defendant. If the defendant requests the instruction, it must be given.” Id.
89

90

Kevin F. O’Malley et al., 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 15:01 (6th ed. 2011).

91

Id.

92

Id.

Id. As a former prosecutor from San Diego, I am partial to the Ninth Circuit’s pat
tern instruction on the credibility of witnesses, which allows the jury to “take into account . . .
the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice;” as well as “the
reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the evidence; and . . . any other factors
that bear on believability.” Manual of Model Crim. Jury Instr. for the Dist. Courts of the
Ninth Cir., Instr. No. 1.8 (2011), available at http://archive.ca9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.
nsf/dcf4f914455891d4882564b40001f6dc/e48de3cb42964d4e882564b4000378f5?OpenDocum
ent (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
93
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jury to “attach such importance or weight to that testimony, if any, that [the jury]
feel[s] it deserves,” after the jury has “ma[de] [its] own judgment or assessment
concerning the believability of a witness.”94
The Tenth Circuit also follows the general thrust of the Federal Jury Practice
& Instructions, but offers a more colloquial instruction on credibility of witnesses:
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
I remind you that it is your job to decide whether the government
has proved the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
In doing so, you must consider all of the evidence. This does not
mean, however, that you must accept all of the evidence as true
or accurate.
You are the sole judges of the credibility or “believability” of each
witness and the weight to be given to the witness’s testimony.
An important part of your job will be making judgments about
the testimony of the witnesses [including the defendant] who
testified in this case. You should think about the testimony of
each witness you have heard and decide whether you believe all
or any part of what each witness had to say, and how important
that testimony was. In making that decision, I suggest that
you ask yourself a few questions: Did the witness impress you
as honest? Did the witness have any particular reason not to
tell the truth? Did the witness have a personal interest in the
outcome in this case? Did the witness have any relationship with
either the government or the defense? Did the witness seem to
have a good memory? Did the witness clearly see or hear the
things about which he/she testified? Did the witness have the
opportunity and ability to understand the questions clearly and
answer them directly? Did the witness’s testimony differ from
the testimony of other witnesses? When weighing the conflicting
testimony, you should consider whether the discrepancy has to
do with a material fact or with an unimportant detail. And you
should keep in mind that innocent misrecollection—like failure
of recollection—is not uncommon.
The testimony of the defendant should be weighed and his
credibility evaluated in the same way as that of any other witness.

94
Kevin F. O’Malley et al., supra note 90, § 15:01. This instruction makes clear that “[t]he
testimony of a defendant should be judged in the same manner as the testimony of any other
witness.” Id. This includes the consideration of “intelligence, motive to falsify, state of mind,” as
well as “the manner in which [the defendant] might be affected by [the] verdict.” Id.
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In reaching a conclusion on particular point, or ultimately in
reaching a verdict in this case, do not make any decisions simply
because there were more witnesses on one side than on the other.95
All three types of pattern instructions demonstrate that the jury must assess
the credibility of the witness (including the defendant), as well as the motive and
weight of the testimony of the defendant, in the same manner as any other witness
at trial. The Eagan rule clearly does not comport with these instructions. Rather,
if the defendant’s testimony is not impeached or improbable, and the defendant’s
credibility is intact, the court requires the jury, through the Eagan rule, to accept
the defendant’s version of events as true. Such a requirement directly contradicts
the statements in each of these pattern instructions, as well as relevant case law in
virtually every other jurisdiction.

B. The United States Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court agrees with the assessment noted above, remarking
on the “longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the stand, ‘his credibility
may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness.’”96
Indeed, “when [a defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally
apply to other witnesses-rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial-are
generally applicable to him as well.”97 In Portuondo v. Agard, a habeas case, the
respondent tried to argue to the U.S. Supreme Court that the prosecution could
not impugn a defendant’s credibility by remarking that the defendant had already
heard testimony at trial before testifying himself.98 However, the Court denied
that assertion, stating: “With respect to issues of credibility, [] no such special
treatment [of a defendant’s testimony] has been accorded.”99 The Court further
stated: “Once a defendant takes the stand, he is ‘subject to cross-examination
impeaching his credibility just like any other witness.’”100 Based on Portunado

95
Pattern Jury Instr. for the Tenth Cir., Crim. Instr. No. 1.08, at 16–17 (2011),
available at http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/downloads/pji10-cir-crim.pdf. The Comment to this
Instruction notes that it is “consistent with United States v. Arias-Santos.” Id. (citing United States
v. Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Coleman, 7 F.3d 1500,
1505–06 (10th Cir. 1993)).
96
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000) (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 154 (1958)).
97

Peery v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989).

529 U.S. at 65–66. Portuondo argued that a prosecutor’s comments about his presence and
“ability to fabricate” his testimony unlawfully burdened his Sixth Amendment right to attend trial
and confront witnesses. Id.
98

99

Id. at 69 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)).

Id. at 70 (quoting Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235–36 (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 420 (1957) (internal quotations omitted))).
100
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alone, the U.S. Supreme Court does not accord defendants special rights based
on their testimony, nor does it demonstrate that a defendant’s testimony must be
accepted as true.
As to the credibility determination of defendants, the U.S. Supreme Court
had spoken previously, in Brooks v. Tennessee.101 Tennessee had a rule requiring
defendants testify at the outset of the defense case-in-chief, or forgo the
opportunity to testify at trial permanently.102 The U.S. Supreme Court declared
this rule unconstitutional; it determined that this rule required a defendant to
decide whether testifying was in his or her best interest before presenting (at least
part of ) his or her defense.103 While the Court acknowledged the ability of a
defendant to engage in “tailoring”—the practice of a defendant to use his presence
in the courtroom during trial to his advantage to tailor his testimony to fit that of
other witnesses—it felt that such a concern did not trump the right to present a
defense.104 Despite the possibility of “tailoring,” the Court determined that a rule
eliminating some decision-making power by the defendant was not the appropriate
remedy. But the Court did suggest that “arguing credibility [of a defendant’s
testimony] to the jury . . . is the preferred means of counteracting tailoring of the
defendant’s testimony.”105 Indeed, as noted in Portuondo: “The adversary system
surely envisions-indeed, it requires-that the prosecutor be allowed to bring to the
jury’s attention the danger [of tailoring testimony]” and thereby implicitly bring
doubt upon the credibility of the defendant on the stand.106
Additionally, in 1895, the United States Supreme Court decided Reagan v.
United States, which dealt with a jury instruction specifically about credibility of
the defendant.107 In that case, the trial court provided an instruction regarding the
defendant’s interest:
You should especially look to the interest which the respective
witnesses have in the suit, or in its result. Where the witness has
a direct personal interest in the result of the suit, the temptation
is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts. The law permits
the defendant, at his own request, to testify in his own behalf.
The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. His
testimony is before you, and you must determine how far it is
credible. The deep personal interest which he may have in the

101

406 U.S. 605 (1972).

102

Id. at 610–11.

103

Id. at 610.

104

Id.

105

Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 70–71.

106

Id. at 70.

107

157 U.S. 301, 304–05 (1895).
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result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing
his evidence, and in determining how far, or to what extent, if at
all, it is worthy of credit.108
The Court noted: “The jury [may] properly consider his manner of
testifying, the inherent probabilities of his story, the amount and character of
the contradictory testimony, the nature and extent of his interest in the result of
the trial, and the impeaching evidence, in determining how much credence he is
entitled to.”109 It further noted that because the defendant was testifying he was
not “unworthy of belief, but at the same time it creates an interest greater than
that of any other witness, and to that extent affects the question of credibility. It
is therefore a matter properly to be suggested by the court to the jury.”110 After
discussing numerous state authorities on the matter, the Court explained that,
The import of these authorities is that the court is not at liberty
to charge the jury, directly or indirectly, that the defendant
is to be disbelieved because he is a defendant, for that would
practically take away the benefit which the law grants when it
give[s] him the privilege of being a witness. On the other hand,
the court may, and sometimes ought, to remind the jury that
interest creates a motive for false testimony; that the greater the
interest the stronger is the temptation, and that the interest of the
defendant in the result of the trial is of a character possessed by
no other witness, and is therefore a matter which may seriously
affect the credence that shall be given to his testimony.111
It ultimately found “nothing of which complaint can reasonably be made” as to
the instruction provided by the trial court.112
These cases demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court deemed a
defendant’s testimony as something important for the jury to examine and
analyze, just like any other witness’ testimony at trial. The Court believed the
jury’s province to include credibility determinations and motives of the defendant,
holding such province of the jury to be inviolate. Thus, U.S. Supreme Court
precedent before the institution of the Eagan rule (and after the development of
108
Id. at 304. In 1878, Congress passed 20 Stat. 30 (March 16, 1878), which stated a
“defendant in a criminal case may, at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
109

Id. at 305.

110

Id.

Id. at 310. The authorities included state opinions from California, Iowa, Missouri,
Michigan, Illinois, New York, Indiana, and even Wyoming, specifically Haines v. Territory, 13 P. 8
(Wyo. 1887). Id.
111

112

Id. at 311.
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that rule) demonstrates that the defendant’s testimony need not be “accepted as
true,” but rather analyzed in accordance with the analysis of all other witnesses
at trial.

C. The Wyoming Supreme Court
In 1887, the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wyoming also agreed with the
standard proposition regarding the jury’s analysis of a defendant’s credibility.113 In
Haines v. Territory, dealing with a prosecution for obtaining property on false pretenses,
“Haines and Others” claimed that the trial court erred in providing the jury an
instruction regarding their credibility.114 The trial court read the following instruction:
The court instructs the jury that, although the law makes the
defendants in this case competent witnesses, still the jury are
the judges of the weight which ought to be attached to their
testimony; and, in considering what weight should be given
it, the jury should take into consideration all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case, as disclosed by the evidence,
and give the defendants’ testimony such weight as they believe
it entitled to in view of all the facts and circumstances proved
in the trial; that, although defendant have a right to be sworn
and give testimony in their behalf, still their credibility, and the
weight to be attached to such testimony, are matters exclusively
for the jury, and their interest in the result of the trial is a matter
proper to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining
what weight ought to be given to their testimony.115
With very little analysis, the court stated that the defendant “conceded that
the above instruction contains nothing but sound legal propositions, and the only
complaint made is that defendants were singled out by the court from the body of
the witnesses for comment.”116 The court ultimately held that the trial court did
not err, based on authorities from California, Missouri, and other states.117

113
Haines v. Territory, 13 P. 8 (Wyo. 1887) (cited and quoted with approval by the Supreme
Court of Washington in State v. Melvern, 72 P. 489 (Wash. 1903)).
114

Id. at 15.

115

Id.

116

Id.

Id.; see Younger v. State, 73 P. 551, 553–54 (Wyo. 1903) (applying the Haines case and
noting a number of other authorities regarding the defendant testimony instruction allowing the
jury to “consider his interest in the result of the trial, in addition to noticing his manner and
taking into consideration the probability of his statements in connecting with the other evidence in
the cause”).
117
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has also held that “generally, . . . a defendant
who testifies in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his credibility,
just like any other witness.”118 Indeed, the court has held that “when a defendant
in a criminal action takes the witness stand in his own defense, his credibility
becomes an issue.”119 Accordingly, as pointed out by the court: “Credibility of
witnesses is always a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine.”120 Thus,
at least according to its own precedent, the Wyoming Supreme Court considers
credibility determinations by the jury, of the defendant who testifies, paramount.
And, prior to Eagan, the Wyoming Supreme Court never decided to eliminate
credibility determinations by the jury merely because a defendant decided
to testify.
Based on the cases discussed above, the Eagan court failed to look at its own
precedent before introducing the Eagan rule into the annals of Wyoming case law.
In Mortimer v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court dealt with a very similar issue
to Eagan and Helton.121 The State charged Mortimer with first-degree murder
for killing his father, and the jury ultimately convicted him of manslaughter.122
Mortimer confessed to the killing, but “sought to justify or excuse the homicide as
an act in defense of the defendant’s brother . . . who was being violently assaulted
by the father.”123 Mortimer admitted that he shot his father, but noted the
exculpatory nature of his crime by claiming he “felt kind of scared that he would
kill my brother.” 124 The court explicitly discussed the fact that the statements were
“the only direct evidence that the [kill] shot was fired by [Mortimer],” much like
the court’s later discussions in both Eagan and Helton.125
Jensen v. State, 116 P.3d 1088, 1095 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149,
1152–53 (Wyo. 1988)); MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 47 (Wyo. 1986); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d
249, 250 (Wyo. 1968)). Of course, it is clearly improper for a prosecutor to question the defendant’s
credibility by asking whether other witnesses are “lying” or “mistaken.” See Schreibvogel v. State, 228
P.3d 874 (Wyo. 2010); Jensen, 116 P.3d at 1095–96; Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522 (Wyo. 1993).
118

Phillip v. State, 225 P.3d 504, 511 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Montez v. State, 670 P.2d 694,
696 (Wyo. 1983)).
119

120

Phillip, 225 P.3d at 511 (quoting Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534 (Wyo. 1993)).

121

161 P. 766 (Wyo. 1916).

122

Id. at 767.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 768.

Compare id. at 769 (noting the rule that, “in a case like this, that a statement, admitting
participation in the homicide which, standing alone, would be a confession, is not changed in
character by exculpatory statements at the same time excusing or justifying it. This is implied by
the well-settled principle that when a confession is offered and admitted, the defendant is entitled
to have all that was said at the time introduced into evidence, including exculpatory statements,
and that a statement directly involving guilt does not lose its character as a confession from the
fact that it was accompanied by statements of an exculpatory nature . . .”) with Eagan v. State, 128
P.2d 215, 226 (Wyo. 1942) (“In such case the admission of the homicide must be considered in
connection with any mitigating or exculpatory statements made in connection therewith.”), and
State v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434, 441–42 (Wyo. 1954) (observing that the State “elect[ed] to rely upon
the testimony of the defendant to prove necessary elements of its charge . . .”).
125
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Unlike Eagan, the Mortimer court reached the right decision on the issue
of jury credibility determination of a defendant’s testimony. After finding the
statements were voluntary, the court concluded that the exculpatory nature of
those statements did not render them inadmissible to the jury. “The jury may
believe the inculpatory statement and disbelieve what the defendant said on
the same occasion in his own favor, and that, it seems, is what the jury did in
finding the defendant guilty of manslaughter.”126 Such a statement is directly
contradictory to the Eagan rule—it demonstrates the province of the jury is to
accept (or disbelieve) the statements made by the defendant—and there is no talk
about “improbable” or “impeached” testimony.
Generally, Mortimer is cited as a self-defense case, or a character-of-victim
case, rather than a domestic violence case resembling Eagan or Helton.127 One
wonders whether the court may not have noticed Mortimer.128 The Mortimer case
is directly on point with Eagan and Helton and demonstrates that the jury is not
required to accept a defendant’s statement as true even if the prosecution uses
the defendant’s statement to prove its case. But rather than cite Mortimer, the
Wyoming Supreme Court relied on out-of-state cases (that did not even bolster its
argument) to development the Eagan rule. This further demonstrates that Eagan
does not follow the Wyoming Supreme Court’s own precedent, however, and that
Eagan was improperly decided.

VI. Conclusion
The Eagan rule is improper, does not comport with current case law, and
clearly does not mesh with U.S. or Wyoming Supreme Court precedent. The
Eagan rule essentially eliminates the normal jury consideration of a defendant’s
testimony. It does not comport with any of the standard pattern criminal jury
instructions currently used in Wyoming, Federal Practice, or the Tenth Circuit.
Additionally, it contradicts prior case law announced in both Wyoming and

126

Mortimer, 161 P. at 768.

See Holloman v. State, 106 P.3d 879, 883–84 (Wyo. 2005) (recognizing the relevance of
the character of victim); Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41, 46–47 (Wyo. 1999) (acknowledging the
principal of offering evidence of the character of victim to explain a defendant’s conduct); Jahnke
v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1005–06 (Wyo. 1984) (distinguishing Mortimer on the grounds that there
had been no showing of self-defense in this case), overruled in part on other grounds by Vaughn v.
State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 923 (Wyo. 1984) (considering the
admissibility of custodial statements by minors); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1380–81 (Wyo.
1981) (allowing the jury to hear evidence of the character of victim); State v. Velsir, 159 P.2d 371,
374–75 (Wyo. 1945) (characterizing Mortimer as a self-defense case).
127

128
It is surprising that the Wyoming Supreme Court (or its clerks) found so many out-of-state
cases to support the Eagan Rule (see supra note 34), and yet the court failed to find Mortimer or
Haines, both directly supporting the normal credibility determination jury instruction on facts very
similar to Eagan.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss1/4

20

Young: Getting away with Murder - Abolition of the Eagan Rule in Wyoming

2012

Abolition of the Eagan Rule in Wyoming

69

the U.S. Supreme Court without acknowledging the contradiction. While the
Wyoming Supreme Court has rightly continued to limit the scope of the Eagan
rule over time, the rule is both bad public policy and not sound. The court should
announce the Eagan rule’s demise, as it does not serve any necessary purpose nor
is it an appropriate jury instruction in this day of confrontation and elimination
of self-serving hearsay.

Appendix A: Cases Applying the Eagan Rule
1. Eagan v. State, 128 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1942)
This is case zero. A jury convicted Dan Eagan of second-degree murder for
killing his wife while he cleaned his loaded gun in the living room. The State
provided evidence of acrimony between the husband and wife, and Eagan testified
on his behalf, claiming that the gun went off accidentally. The crux of the case
dealt with the malice issue, and the Wyoming Supreme Court deemed it necessary
to introduce the Eagan rule because the State “relie[d], as in the case at bar, on the
statement or evidence of the defendant to establish one of the necessary elements
of the crime charged.”129 The court ruled that “where the [S]tate must rely upon
the defendant’s admission alone for essential elements of its case,” the rule of
verbal segregation of a defendant’s statements does not apply.130 In other words,
the Wyoming Supreme Court introduced this new rule that, if the State needs the
defendant’s statement to prove essential elements of the crime, the statement must
be accepted as true facts.

2. State v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1954)
A jury convicted Helton of second-degree murder for killing her husband by
shooting him with five shots from a revolver. She claimed the deceased threatened
to kill her, forced her to write a suicide note, and she got the gun to scare him.
The court applied the Eagan rule:
We are satisfied that the prosecution failed to successfully
impeach the credibility of the defendant. It failed to prove its
asserted motive. It failed to substantiate its claim that the scene
of the shooting was altered. It did, however, elect to rely upon
the testimony of the defendant to prove necessary elements of
its charge and, under the law of this state, . . . the defendant
being the sole witness to the transaction charged as a crime, her

129

Eagan v. State, 128 P.2d 215, 225 (Wyo. 1942).

130

Id.
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testimony must be accepted as true, as it . . . is not improbable,
and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown,
but it reasonably consistent therewith . . . .”131
The court then fairly stated:
[T]he defendant, being the sole living witness to the shooting,
her testimony, including that portion describing her condition
and the antecedent reasons for it, all tending to show that she
was in a highly upset, frightened, and confused emotional
and impassioned condition, should not have been rejected by
the jury. Her . . . story was not shown to be improbable nor
inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but was
in fact shown to be reasonably consistent with such facts and
circumstances and, therefore, the jury had no right to convict
her of a greater crime than that of voluntary manslaughter.132

3. State v. Lindsay, 317 P.2d 506 (Wyo. 1957)
A jury convicted Lindsay of first-degree murder for a killing while he tried
to pilfer gas from what he thought was an abandoned truck on the side of the
road.133 Lindsay approached the rear of a truck with a pistol in his hand, surprised
the victim who yelled and swung at him, and Lindsay then shot him.134 Lindsay
and his accomplice “after some conversation, then determined to take the truck,
hide the body, and cover up the crime.”135 Lindsay requested an Eagan-type
instruction, described as:
You are instructed that uncontroverted evidence should
ordinarily be taken as true and uncontroverted evidence which
is not improbable or unreasonable cannot be disregarded, even
if it comes from an interested witness, and unless shown to be
untrustworthy, is conclusive.136
131

State v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434, 442 (Wyo. 1954) (quoting Eagan, 128 P.2d at 226).

132

Id. at 443. The court also contended:
[If ] the defendant is guilty of murder, we ought to be able to find a motive, although
motive is not essential. The absence of motive should have considerable influence
in determining the degree of guilt. The complete failure of the prosecution to offer
even a scintilla of evidence to bear out its claim that the defendant killed for money,
deflates even the state’s theory of malice.

Id.
133

State v. Lindsay, 317 P.2d 506, 507 (Wyo. 1957).

134

Id.

135

Id.

Id. at 508. (quoting Instruction D-3, which Lindsay complained the trial court failed to
provide to the jury).
136
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The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that such an instruction was not
justified under Eagan.137 The court noted:
A careful reading of [Eagan] with emphasis on the statement
quoted by the defendant discloses a modification of the general
rule that the jury are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses.
Nevertheless, such statement is much more comprehensive
than the instruction offered by the defendant; and no reason
has been suggested why the rule stated in the Eagan case should
be altered.138
Lindsay also requested an instruction that did not fulfill the Eagan rule
requirements, but the court still considered it improper.139 The court found this
instruction’s “wording . . . conflicting and confusing” and also noted “the record
clearly shows that [D]efendant was the only person present as an eyewitness at the
time of the shooting.”140 The court then noted that “Instruction 23 given by the
court without objection . . . states more clearly . . . the gist of the requirements set
out in the Eagan case and repeated in State v. Helton.”141 That instruction read:
You are instructed that in this case the accused, Ernest
Lindsay, is the sole witness to the killing of the deceased. If from
the evidence you find that his testimony is not improbable and is
not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but is
reasonably consistent therewith, and his credibility has not been
impeached, then his testimony should be accepted.142
Despite receiving an Eagan instruction, the jury still convicted Lindsay of firstdegree murder.
4. Martinez v. State, 342 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1959)
A jury convicted Martinez of first-degree murder and sentenced him to die
in the gas chamber for killing a fellow employee on a ranch in Fremont County.
137
Id. (“The required instruction while containing some of the wording use in the Eagan case
would tend to preclude the jury from evaluating the testimony of the witnesses.”).
138

Id.

139

Id. at 509. The instruction was:
You are instructed that in this case the accused and . . . his accomplice, are the sole
witnesses to the crime charged. If, from the evidence, you find that their testimony is
not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, but
is reasonably consistent therewith, and their credibility has not been impeached, then
their testimony should be accepted.

Id.
140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.
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Martinez and the deceased went out “drinking and carousing” in Lander and
drank to excess.143 At first, Martinez claimed that they “had a fight with some
Indians” who followed them to the ranch and shot the deceased.144 Martinez then
changed his story after authorities found his fingerprints on the .22 rifle murder
weapon. He then claimed that the deceased had used mean words with him and
challenged him to a fight; after they returned home, the deceased again called him
an “old son of a bitch” before Martinez went to sleep.145 At that point, Martinez
believed that the deceased would cut his throat while he slept, so he went out to
the yard, retrieved the rifle, and shot the deceased in the head.146
The court stated it was “fully cognizant of the rule that the exculpatory part
of a confession need not be believed.”147 It then noted, however, that “we think
that if any essential element must be supported by other evidence before there can
be a valid conviction” and that “the admission of homicide must be considered
in connection with any mitigating or exculpatory statements made in connection
therewith.”148 The court then found four statements wherein there “was no evidence
produced by the State which contradicted these statements of defendant.”149
Finding that “[e]vidence of premeditation, other than the confession, was entirely
lacking; and the confession introduced uncontradicted factors which negatived
[sic] premeditated malice,” the court ordered the district court to sentence the
defendant to second-degree, rather than first-degree, murder.150
In this case, the Wyoming Supreme Court appeared to pick and choose
factors to apply the Eagan rule to, rather than looking at the testimony from a
holistic standpoint—clearly the testimony by Martinez was not credible and had
been impeached, and yet the court still allowed the Eagan rule in this case.

5. Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1963)
A jury convicted Nunez of second-degree murder for a savage bar fight and
killing.151 Nunez testified that the victim did not want to quit fighting, that he
continually stated, “have you got enough?” and “let’s quit,” and he “told the
bartender and another man to, ‘Go make sure that man is all right.’”152 The
143

Martinez v. State, 342 P.2d 227, 228 (Wyo. 1959).

144

Id.

145

Id. at 229.

146

Id. at 229, 231.

147

Id. at 231 (citing, inter alia, Mortiner v. State, 161 P. 766 (Wyo. 1916)).

148

Id. (quoting Eagan v. State, 128 P.2d 215, 225 (Wyo. 1942)).

149

Id.

150

Id.

Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 726–28 (Wyo. 1963). Blood was found all over the ground
where the victim lay, “and up on the wall a distance of 5 feet 8 inches. [The victim’s] face and right
eye were said to have been badly damaged. . . . Nunez had no serious injuries.” Id. at 728.
151

152

Id. at 727–29.
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court noted that, as to the elements of malice and purposefulness, “[n]one of
this testimony was contradicted. If true, it would refute the idea that Nunez
deliberately or intentionally tried to kill his opponent.”153 Applying the Eagan
rule, the court found that the “[S]tate therefore failed to prove that the killing
of [the victim] was purposely done by Nunez” and deemed “it unnecessary to
be precise in determining whether the [S]tate has sufficiently met its burden of
proving a malicious killing.”154 Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that the murder conviction should be reduced to manslaughter under Eagan.155
Having looked at all of the cases requesting the Eagan rule, I believe that this
may be the only case wherein application of that rule was actually warranted
and had merit. Given the facts and circumstances, however, I am surprised that
the prosecutor chose to pursue a murder case in the first place, as manslaughter
appears much more appropriate.

6. Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977)
A jury convicted Smith of second-degree murder for the killing of her
husband’s paramour.156 According to her own testimony, after she found her
husband’s and his mistress’ cars parked at a bowling alley lane at 3:30 a.m., she
returned home and retrieved a loaded handgun and returned to wait outside
a nearby motel.157 After receiving the motel room number from a clerk in the
morning, Smith accosted her husband outside the room and demanded to speak
to him and the mistress.158 She then saw the mistress driving away and Smith began
to return to her house by car; at some point she saw the mistress again on the road,
she followed her to her house, motioned to her to come and talk to her at the
car, and shot her through the thigh and back with a hollow-point bullet.159 Smith
“admitted having shot the deceased and that the death occurred as a result. . . .
The sole argument asserted at trial by defendant was that she was guilty of
manslaughter and not second degree murder, as charged.”160
The court first held that the “circumstances here were clearly sufficient to allow
such an inference” that her use of deadly weapon denoted intent and “possibly even
premeditation.”161 The trial court allowed the Eagan rule to apply and provided
the Eagan instruction to the jury. Smith requested an instruction reading:
153

Id. at 729.

154

Id.

155

Id. at 729–30.

156

Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1196–97 (Wyo. 1977).

157

Id. at 1197.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 1198.
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Defendant’s refused Instruction A:
You are hereby instructed that the Defendant in this case has
made a statement to the State and has taken the stand in her own
behalf, under such circumstances where the State must rely upon
the statements of Defendant alone for the proof of intent for the
commission of the of the crime of second degree murder, and
other parts of her statement are consistent with her admission
of guilt of the crime of manslaughter, you cannot accept such
evidence in support of the charge of second degree murder and
disregard the same as evidence of guilt of manslaughter.162
The court noted, “[w]hile hinted at, the principles contained in defendant’s
rejected instruction did not correctly paraphrase the Eagan principle. The trial
judge gave the instruction exactly announced in Eagan.”163 That instruction read:
Instruction 8:
A defendant who wishes to testify, is a competent witness. A
defendant’s testimony is to be judged in the same way as that of
any other witness.
If a defendant is a sole witness of the transaction charged as a crime,
her testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected. If her credibility has
not been impeached, and her testimony is not improbable, and
is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown but
is reasonably consistent therewith, then her testimony should
be accepted.164
Despite receiving the Eagan instruction, the jury still convicted Smith of
second-degree murder. The court stated:
[T]he State did not rely upon the statements and testimony
of the defendant [sic] but independently proved intent by the
circumstances of defendant [sic] returning to her home to pick
up a loaded handgun, pursuing her husband to the motel, her
tracking down of the deceased victim, accosting and shooting her
with a weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.165

162

Id. at 1201 n.4 (internal quotations omitted).

163

Id. at 1201.

164

Id. at 1201 n.5.

165

Id. at 1201–02.
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Accordingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court questioned whether the Eagan rule
should have applied in this case at all.166 The court reaffirmed the proposition
that “[w]hen the conditions of the Eagan instruction are not met, there is no
mandatory requirement that the defendant’s statements be accepted.”167

Appendix B: Cases Where a Defendant’s Request
for the Eagan Rule is Denied
1. State v. Goettina, 158 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1945)
The jury convicted defendant of manslaughter for shooting his ex-wife in a
hotel bar owned by Goettina. He claimed that his ex-wife constantly harassed him
and threatened him, sought to take ownership of his hotel, and tried to get her
new boyfriend to kill him. The victim came to his hotel bar the night of her death
and would not leave; Goettina claimed that she attacked him with a knife and
he killed her with her firearm. His defense counsel, on appeal, sought application
of the Eagan rule, “in connection with the point of credit to be given to the
testimony of [Goettina].”168 The court found no parallels between Eagan and
this case, the defendant’s statements were inconsistent, and the physical evidence
did not seem to corroborate Goettina’s testimony. As a result, the court denied
defendant’s request to apply the Eagan rule.
In Goettina, the Wyoming Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the
trial court provided two credibility instructions to the jury—one for “regular”
witnesses and one for the defendant. In addition to the instruction on credibility
of witnesses generally, the trial court read “Instruction No. 16”:
The court instructs the jury that under the law the defendant
has the right to testify in his own behalf, but the credibility and
weight to be given to his testimony are matters exclusively for
the jury. In weighing the testimony of the defendant in this
case, you have the right to take into consideration his manner of
testifying, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his account
of the transaction and his interest in the result of the verdict as
affecting his credibility. You are not required to receive blindly
the testimony of the accused as true, but you are to consider
whether it is true and made in good faith, or only for the purpose
of avoiding conviction.169

166

Id. at 1202.

167

Id. (citing Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977)).

168

State v. Goettina, 158 P.2d 865, 879 (Wyo. 1945).

169

Id.
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The court did not find the giving of two separate instructions to be error, but
noted its distaste for two such instructions.170 Furthermore, the author of the
opinion, Chief Justice Fred H. Blume, announced his belief that, “generally
speaking, it would be better and fairer not to single out the defendant in an
instruction such as here mentioned, unless special circumstances should require
it, or unless the defendant should ask for an instruction as to his competency and
credibility as a witness.”171

2. State v. Alexander, 324 P.2d 831 (Wyo. 1958)
A jury convicted Alexander of second-degree murder for killing his second wife
and burying her body under concrete in his basement.172 Alexander brought his
soon-to-be second wife into his household with his first wife (and their collective
four kids) before the murder.173 He then divorced his first wife and continued to
live with all seven together (and shortly thereafter added another child for a total
of eight persons living in the same house).174 Upon his second wife’s complaint, he
moved his now ex-wife out of her hometown, and then back to Casper in one of
his trailers.175 Alexander continued to visit his ex-wife in his trailer, upon which his
current wife quarreled with him and threatened to leave.176 On the night that his
wife disappeared, persons heard “both male and female voices and a commotion
were heard coming from [Alexander]’s home, after which a car resembling
[Alexander]’s automobile was see[n] leaving [his] back yard going fast around
the house and down the alley.”177 Afterwards, Alexander “kept the basement door
nailed shut,” brought his ex-wife back to live with him at the home, and then
“proceeded to lay a concrete floor in the basement of his home.”178 Alexander then
began making comments that his wife was dead, she was stepping out on him,
that she threatened suicide, that he saw her on the street, and that he felt close to
her when he slept in the basement.179 Finally, after exhaustive investigation, the
ex-wife gave police permission to tear up the basement floor, and police found the
wife’s body with serious fractures on her head.180 The Wyoming Supreme Court
noted that Alexander’s “several testimonies” were
170
Id. at 879–80. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that giving the instruction was not
prejudicial error, but discussed the “strong minority” that “takes the opposite view.” Id. at 880.
171

Id. at 880.

172

State v. Alexander, 324 P.2d 831, 833–34 (Wyo. 1958).

173

Id. at 833.

174

Id. at 833–34.

175

Id. at 834.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

Id. Alexander finally reported her missing to police approximately eight months after she
“disappeared.” Id.
179

180

Id. at 835–36.
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. . . so fraught with discrepancies and inconsistencies that the
jury would have been justified in discrediting those portions,
which, if believed, would have been favorable to defendant, and
in concluding that the defendant was attempting to conceal the
fact that he knew [the victim] had been killed and interred in
his basement.181
Alexander offered a jury instruction close to the Eagan rule, which the trial court
denied.182 The court noted, however, that “the [S]tate’s evidence in the case at bar
was opposed to the testimony of the witness who was claiming to have witnessed
the death of [the victim]. The offered instruction was, therefore, completely
misleading, did not state the law, and was properly refused.”183

3. Dickey v. State, 444 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1968)
A jury convicted Dickey of first-degree murder of a married woman he was
courting (while he, himself, was also married).184 Dickey testified that he took his
married victim to “a secluded spot and had made advances toward her after which
she suggested she might tell [his] wife and might call police.”185 She then walked
away in a snowstorm, his visibility was impaired, and “he accidentally struck and
killed her with his automobile.”186 At that point, he panicked, put her body in
the car’s trunk, stopped at a gas station to fill his car and a gas can, and burned
the body out in the country.187 A gas station attendant testified, however, that the
victim was “lying in the back seat of Dickey’s car and that he saw scratches on
her face from which blood was oozing, and saw her breathe.”188 Dickey argued
that the Eagan rule applied, “since [his] credibility was not impeached and his
testimony was not improbable and not inconsistent with the facts shown, [so]
the jury was bound to accept his testimony and find for him on his defense of
accidental killing.”189 The court declined to impose this instruction, given that
Dickey’s “credibility was impeached and put in doubt by the evidence” and because
“the testimony of defendant was contradicted by evidence on behalf of the State,
which the jury had a right to believe.”190 The court noted “ample evidence for

181

Id. at 836.

182

Id. at 841.

183

Id.

184

Dickey v. State, 444 P.2d 373, 374–75 (Wyo. 1968).

185

Id.

186

Id. at 375.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 374 (citing Eagan v. State, 128 P.2d 215, 226 (Wyo. 1942)).

190

Id.
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[the jury] to believe the running down was deliberate and intentional” and that it
did “not consider [Dickey’s] story so probable and likely that the jury could not
disbelieve the part about the killing being accidental.”191

4. Buckles v. State, 500 P.2d 518 (Wyo. 1972)
Buckles shot and killed the man that had just raped his wife that same
evening, and the State prosecuted him for first-degree murder.192 He claimed that,
after his wife told him she had been raped, Buckles got a .30-06 rifle, drove to
the deceased’s house, and confronted him outside of his truck. He believed that
the deceased had a gun and, when he told the deceased he was going to take him
to the police, the deceased appeared to reach inside of his truck. Buckles testified
that at that point,
I grabbed the gun and I threw a shell in it and I just shot at him
. . . . I didn’t mean to kill him, because it has a scope sight on it
and I just threw the shell in there and I shot at him. Maybe shake
him up and maybe get him away from his pickup.193
Buckles argued that under Eagan and Helton, his statement failed to
demonstrate malice or premeditation.194 The court found, however, that the
prosecution adequately demonstrated premeditation and malice based on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing.195 While Buckles claimed that
Helton modified Eagan, the court found them “completely consistent” and further
found “[s]trong motive present here.”196

5. Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977)
A jury convicted Raigosa of second-degree murder after killing a six-year old
girl.197 Cheyenne police arrived at a gruesome scene wherein the “child’s body was
badly bruised (torso, legs, arms), cut and her head had been shaved. There were
blood stains on the walls and carpet and fecal matter on the floor.”198 Raigosa first
told police that the girl had been in Denver and was injured between two cars, but
then recanted and at the station indicated he “had begun spanking the deceased

191

Id. at 375.

192

Buckles v. State, 500 P.2d 518, 519–21 (Wyo. 1972).

193

Id. at 520.

194

Id. at 521.

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1011–12 (Wyo. 1977).

198

Id. at 1012.
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and lost his temper.”199 Raigosa claimed he should have received the Eagan
instruction, but the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, “not only were some of the
required Eagan conditions not fulfilled, but the jury was adequately informed
as to its role on witness credibility and limitations therefore by numerous other
jury instructions.”200 Raigosa failed to testify, but “expected the jury to accept
statements favorable to him, without question, excerpted from the statements he
had given the police.”201 Indeed, the court implied that “the instruction would
damage the defendant because his explanations were so improbable and so
inconsistent with the facts and circumstances that it would only draw additional
attention of the jury to the implausibility of his position.”202

6. Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977)
A jury convicted Cullin of second-degree murder for the killing of her
common law husband when he attempted to register a motel room for him and
another woman.203 Cullin claimed that she shot the victim between the eyes when
he came into her car, and “started choking her until her tongue was hanging
out, her breath was almost gone and her eyes were hurting.”204 Other testimony
established, however, that she had made threats to kill both the victim and his
mistress that night, she returned to her mobile home and picked up a handgun,
and then began cruising to find the victim during his tryst.205 Additionally, forensic
evidence demonstrated that there was no evidence of gunpowder burns near the
wound, the “conclusion being that the weapon, when fired, was over [four feet]
from its target.”206 Furthermore, testimony from the motel manager contradicted
specific testimony by Cullin when she claimed that she went into the motel
office and talked with the victim and told him to enjoy himself as she left the
motel office.207 The court found “defendant’s testimony was not consistent with
the facts and circumstances shown,” and noted numerous “inconsistencies” and
“inconsistent evidence” with Cullin’s testimony.208 Furthermore, “[D]efendant

Id. He also stated that the girl’s head was shaved “as a disciplinary measure,” and an officer
testified that the fecal matter “resulted from the child’s fear and not a dog.” Id. at 1014.
199

200

Id. at 1016.

201

Id.

Id. at 1016–17. It actually seems paradoxical that the Wyoming Supreme Court sought to
look out for the defendant’s best interests by not allowing the Eagan Rule in this case.
202

203

Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 448–50 (Wyo. 1977).

204

Id. at 450.

205

Id. at 448–50.

Id. at 450. Additionally, medical evidence demonstrated that she had no marks, bruises or
scratches “whatsoever” from the victim’s choking episode of Cullin. Id. at 453.
206

207

Id. at 449–50.

208

Id. at 452–53.
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was not the sole witness to the crime. There were many witnesses to the bits
and pieces forming . . . the foundation of the circumstantial evidence case.”209
Indeed, the “jury was adequately instructed that it was its duty to determine the
credibility of witnesses, that they were the exclusive judges of the facts and that a
presumption of innocence was with the defendant throughout the trial.”210

7. Doe v. State, 569 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1977)
A jury convicted Doe of second-degree murder of her former husband after
Doe did not deny the homicide.211 The court noted, “whenever the State attempts
to rely on a defendant’s testimony to prove an element of the alleged offense,
another principle must be considered,” specifically referring to the Eagan rule.212
However, the court then explained that the Eagan rule is “applicable only where
the defendant’s explanation remains uncontradicted, either directly or by fair
inference from the testimony and evidence.”213 “First,” the court noted, “there
was medical testimony that the deceased would have dropped immediately upon
entry of the fatal bullet.”214 Such medical testimony clearly contradicted Doe’s
claim that she shot the victim while he was facing her, but that he turned his head
as she shot him and that he then fell backwards out of the door.215 In addition,
another witness testified that he saw the victim “come out of the door face-forward
and fall behind another car.”216 And the court noted evidence of Doe’s lack of
remorse regarding the shooting, as well as evidence of her “propensity to react
violently in a retaliatory fashion.”217 Thus, the medical testimony and physical
observations by other witnesses clearly demonstrated problems with Doe’s story
and her availing to the Eagan rule. As a matter of course, the court could not say
as “a matter of law that appellant’s version of the shooting remained reasonably
unimpeached. There were facts, therefore, from which the jury might fairly have
drawn an inference of malice.”218

8. Leitel v. State, 579 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1978)
A jury convicted Leitel of second-degree murder for the killing of the male
friend of his former common-law wife.219 Leitel arrived at the house of his former
common-law wife, saw his wife and her friend in the kitchen, and “[g]rabbed his
209

Id. at 453.

210

Id.

211

Doe v. State, 569 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Wyo. 1977).

212

Id. at 1279 (citing State v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434, 442 (Wyo. 1954)).

213

Id.

214

Id. at 1280.

215

Id. at 1278.

216

Id.

217

Id. at 1280.

218

Id.

219

Leitel v. State, 579 P.2d 421, 422–23 (Wyo. 1978).
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rifle and ran to the door.”220 He threatened to kill them and himself, and “as [his
wife] turned to go to the bathroom, [Leitel] pulled the trigger, fatally wounding
[the victim].”221
Leitel testified that he lacked the intent to kill the victim. Specifically, he
testified: “I just though, well, I will get the hell out of here. . . . I backed up and
[the victim] was coming toward me. . . . I backed over in this thing and sometime
in here the gun went off.”222 He further testified that, “as he was backing out of
the kitchen, he stumbled over a small ledge on the floor, slammed against the wall,
and accidentally discharged the gun.”223 In this case, Leitel received the Eagan
rule as one of the jury instructions, and still requested the court to “employ the
Eagan Rule to negate the jury’s finding of intent and malice.”224 The court found
that “there was other and sufficient evidence of malice and intent, and therefore
the jury did not ‘arbitrarily reject’ the defendant’s testimony.”225 The court noted
that the evidence “with the proof of other material and relevant circumstances
surrounding the incident,” did not create the “condition precedent to a reversal
under the Eagan Rule.”226

9. Searles v. State, 589 P.2d 386 (Wyo. 1979)
A jury convicted Searles of manslaughter after she shot and killed a man
living in her development as a maintenance man.227 According to Searles, the
victim “forced himself upon the defendant on several occasions, apparently
resulting in sexual relations between them. . . . [The victim] threatened her and
her family, and . . . he tortured the defendant on numerous occasions.”228 When
a light bulb went off near one of the apartments, Searles went to ask another
tenant to change the light bulb (which was across from the victim’s residence).229
When the victim opened the door, he came towards her asking what she was
doing and “then grabbed her between the legs just as the hallway became
completely dark. The defendant groaned and then reached into her coat pocket,
pulled out a revolver, and pulled the trigger until her hands went limp.”230 Other

220

Id. at 423.

221

Id.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

Id. at 424.
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Id. at 425.
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Id.
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Searles v. State, 589 P.2d 386, 388 (Wyo. 1979).
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230

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

33

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 12 [2012], No. 1, Art. 4

82

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 12

witnesses testified that the victim “pleasantly asked” what was going on, and then
immediately got shot as the victim moved to close the door.231 Searles argued that,
as the sole witness, the Eagan instruction should have been given and that the
trial court erred by refusing to give that instruction, over her objection.232 The
Wyoming Supreme Court found that the “defendant was not the sole witness to
the events immediately surrounding the shooting of [the victim].”233 And other
witnesses “testified with respect to certain parts of the entire occurrence, and to an
extent, presented evidence at variance with portions of the defendant’s version of
the shooting.”234

10. Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1979)
A jury convicted Leeper of second-degree murder after she shot a man
attacking her husband in a bar fight.235 She claimed “self-defense, or defense of
another” and stated that she “was deathly afraid of [the victim], and when he
turned towards her, she feared he would ‘finish off ’ [her husband], then assault
her.”236 She argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the
Eagan rule, claiming that she “was the sole witness to the event” and that her
testimony was not improbable nor inconsistent with the facts and her credibility
was not impeached.237 Based on plain error review, the court could not “find that
the Eagan rule should have been applied, and [was] unwilling to extend Eagan to
cover the facts of this case.”238 In accordance with Raigosa, the court noted that
the “Eagan rule is not to be applied unless all of the conditions are fulfilled.”239
Because the husband and other bar patrons testified about events surrounding the
shooting, Leeper “was not the sole witness” and the court declined to apply the
Eagan rule to her situation.240

Id. at 388–89. A pathologist testified that the victim was shot three times in the back
and twice in the front, while a forensic scientist testified that all the shots were from four feet and
beyond. Id.
231

232

Id. at 390.

233

Id.

234

Id.

235

Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 381 (Wyo. 1979).

236

Id. at 381–82.

237

Id. at 382.

Id. (citing Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977) and Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726
(Wyo. 1963)).
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Id. (citing Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977)).

240

Id.
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11. Gore v. State, 627 P.2d 1384 (Wyo. 1981)
A jury convicted Gore of manslaughter for the death of his wife. She was shot
through her jaw and out the back of her head with a .44 magnum pistol.241 At
trial, Gore told police that he could not remember what happened, whereupon
he had told officers a few hours after the incident that his wife brought the pistol
from their bedroom and that he tried to take it from her when it fired.242 The
court noted that while Gore “is the only witness to the events, his testimony is
inconsistent not only with the circumstantial evidence but also with the various
versions of the story he told.”243 The court noted that the Eagan rule could
not apply when the witness’ testimony was contradicted: “If it did, this would
be tantamount to holding that the jury must accept any story offered by the
defendant that would exonerate him.”244 Furthermore, the court noted that even
if the jury had accepted his first version, the jury might still not have found him
innocent, given that either disarming his wife or playing with a pistol would still
be evidence of manslaughter.245

12. Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983)
A jury convicted Cutbirth of second-degree murder after he “got his gun
from a cabinet and removed it from its holster. The gun discharged; the bullet
struck his wife in the head [right between the eyes] and killed her.”246 Cutbirth
relied on Eagan to claim “the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the killing was done purposely and maliciously.”247 The court indicated that
Eagan “has limitations; it does not help [Cutbirth] under the facts of this case.”248
Cutbirth failed to testify, and, “[c]onsidering [Cutbirth’s] various and conflicting
accounts of the circumstances surrounding the shooting, the jury could reasonably
conclude that [Cutbirth’s] credibility had been impeached, that his stories were
inconsistent and that the exculpatory portions were improbable.”249 After citing
241

Gore v. State, 627 P.2d 1384, 1385–86 (Wyo. 1981).

Id. at 1386. He later “told another officer that he and the victim were ‘playing’ with the
gun in the bedroom and that the victim grabbed the gun which he said he was holding when it
discarged.” Id.
242

243

Id. at 1387.

244

Id.

Id. Gore’s “repeated use of the terminology ‘playing with’ and ‘messing with’ when referring
to the handling of the pistol is enough to cause legitimate doubts as to whether he appreciates the
level of care that a reasonable person is required to use when handling a loaded weapon.” Id.
245

246
Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 889–90 (Wyo. 1983). Cutbirth “pointed the gun toward his
wife before its discharge” and it discharged within two feet of the victim’s forehead. Id. Additionally,
he used a .357 magnum revolver, which he then threw outside following the shooting. Id.
247

Id. at 890.

248

Id.

249

Id.
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Doe v. State, the court specifically noted that under Eagan, the “jury is at liberty to
accept portions of appellant’s testimony that it deems to be reasonable and reject
the other portions.”250

13. Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1986)
A jury convicted Cheatham of involuntary manslaughter for the beating and
killing of his wife during an argument.251 While some witnesses testified as to
the victim’s fall at a local Evanston dance club and arguments between her and
Cheatham, Cheatham himself alleged that “his wife fell down some stairs at the
house . . . they then engaged in a struggle. He said that at one point he pushed his
wife causing her to fall against a door and then to the floor.”252 Post-conviction,
Cheatham argued, “the jury was required to accept his version of the incident in
the home in accordance with [Eagan] and, given that requirement, the [S]tate has
no evidence of the other elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.”253
The court found “Cheatham’s reliance on these propositions is misplaced” because
he failed to testify and that “the testimony of the accused was inconsistent not
only with the circumstantial evidence but also internally inconsistent because of
various versions of the story that he related.”254

14. Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145 (Wyo. 1986)
In 1986, the Wyoming Supreme Court finally seemed to be on the verge of
doing something about the Eagan rule in Dangel v. State.255 The State charged
Dangel with three counts of vehicular homicide for his role in a fatal accident
near Worland, Wyoming.256 At an intersection, Dangel failed to stop at a stop
sign and swerved to avoid a tractor-trailer, collided with a pickup, and killed three
victims.257 Dangel argued that “the brakes failed suddenly and that the deaths of the
victims were due to an accident which occurred without criminal negligence.”258
Dangel testified about his familiarity with the intersection. He also testified that
he road-tested his brakes prior to leaving to pick up waste water and that the

250

Id.

251

Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 615–16 (Wyo. 1986).

252

Id. at 615.

253

Id. at 622.

Id. at 623 Cheatham also “told one witness that he had killed his wife and stated to another
that he had vigorously assaulted her. Given these circumstances Cheatham is foreclosed from
reliance upon the application of Eagan.” Id.
254

255

724 P.2d 1145 (Wyo. 1986).

256

Id. at 1146. The State charged Dangel with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(a) (1977).

257

Id.

258

Id. at 1147.
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brakes seemed “‘a little soft, but I was able to stop the truck, no problem.’”259 The
State elicited other testimony about the truck’s brakes, including that they were
replaced three months before the incident and that the braking efficiency was 100
percent.260
The crux of the case against Dangel required the jury to conclude that
“Dangel knew that the brakes on the truck were not operating effectively” and
that Dangel’s failure to remedy the brake situation “was criminally negligent
conduct.”261 Alternatively, it required the jury to “disbelieve[] Dangel and his
expert witness with respect to the brake failure [and find] that the brakes were
functioning properly but that Dangel failed to apply the brakes in order to stop at
the intersection.”262
Dangel argued for application of the Eagan rule, stating that “even though
there might be sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts he still is entitled
to a reversal based upon the language of the court in Eagan.”263 Judge Urbigkit,
in a special concurrence, noted that, as of 1986, the court had “examined the
[Eagan] Rule in . . . 17 cases, but . . . applied it in only two.”264 At that point, the
court only found the rule applicable in Helton and Nunez.265 He further noted
that, from Helton, Leitel, and Doe, whether the court should apply the Eagan rule
is a matter of law.266 Justice Urbigkit further stated, “It is the trial court, and in
the appropriate instance the appellate court, which determines whether Eagan
applies. This remains true whether or not any jury instruction incorporating
Eagan is offered at trial.”267

259

Id.

260

Id.

261

Id. at 1148.

262

Id.

263

Id.

Id. at 1150 (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring). The seventeen cases include: Cheatham v.
State, 719 P.2d 612 (Wyo. 1986); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Gore v. State, 627 P.2d
1384 (Wyo. 1981); Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1979); Searles v. State, 589 P.2d 386 (Wyo.
1979); Leitel v. State, 579 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1978); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977); Doe v.
State, 569 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1977); Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977); Smith v. State, 564
P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977); Buckles v. State, 500 P.2d 518, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850 (Wyo. 1972); Dickey
v. State, 444 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1968); Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1963); State v. Alexander, 324
P.2d 831, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850 (Wyo. 1958); State v. Lindsay, 317 P.2d 506 (Wyo. 1957); State
v. Helton, 276 P.2d 434 (Wyo. 1954); and State v. Goettina, 158 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1945).
264

Dangel, 724 P.2d at 1150. By my count, however, I count application in five cases, not
including Eagan: Helton, Lindsay, Martinez, Nunez, and Smith. See Appendix A, supra notes 131–67.
265

266

Dangel, 724 P.2d at 1151.

267

Id.
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15. Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988)
A jury convicted Griffin of voluntary manslaughter after she killed her
estranged husband while in a generally drunken state.268 Griffin argued that she
killed her husband in self-defense and requested a self-defense jury instruction
that the jury rejected by convicting Griffin.269 On appeal, she “relie[d] in part
on the Eagan [R]ule to advance her contention that the killing was justified by
reason of self-defense.”270 While Griffin was the only witness to the shooting, the
court noted that “other people witnessed the events leading up to the shooting,”
including testimony that the victim made a fearful statement after Griffin’s first
shot and that the victim “was struck from a weapon fired from a distance of more
than five feet.”271 Accordingly, the court found “substantial evidence to support
the jury’s rejection of the self-defense claim and substantial evidence to support its
finding” of voluntary manslaughter.272

16. Drieman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo. 1992)
A jury convicted Drieman of burglary after he entered his ex-girlfriend’s trailer
and stole pictures of her new boyfriend and her kids, letters he had written to her,
her auto and trailer keys, and also wrote down her unlisted phone number and
social security number.273 He subsequently returned the keys (and her calendar)
after he made copies for himself. 274 During trial, Drieman testified that he entered
the trailer without permission, but that he returned the keys and calendar and
therefore lacked the “[s]pecific intent to commit larceny” required for his burglary
conviction.275 Accordingly, pursuant to the Eagan rule, Drieman argued that the
jury should find him guilty of the lesser-included offense of criminal entry because
“the prosecution relie[d] on a statement of the defendant to establish one of the
necessary elements of the crime charged.”276 Because he believed “his testimony
as to his intent was uncontroverted,” Drieman could only be found guilty of
criminal entry.277 The court found, however, that Drieman’s “testimony was not

268

Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 248-49 (Wyo. 1988).

269

Id. at 249.

270

Id. at 252.

271

Id.

272

Id.

273

Drieman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 761 (Wyo. 1992). Drieman also cut the victim’s phone

wire. Id.
274

Id.

275

Id.

276

Id. at 762.

277

Id.
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uncontradicted as claimed, and Eagan, therefore, [did] not apply.”278 This was the
first of three cases I found wherein the Eagan rule was requested when a death had
not occurred.

17. Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200 (Wyo. 1992)
A jury convicted Glazier of aggravated vehicular homicide following a fatal
motorcycle accident with his blood alcohol content listed at 0.17 percent.279 At
the scene of the accident, Glazier claimed that he was driving the bike and that
he was afraid to apply the brakes in the loose dirt after they “‘were pushed wide in
the corner.’”280 During trial, Glazier testified that, in fact, “after they left the town
traffic in Buffalo, [the victim] began driving and was driving when the accident
occurred.”281 Glazier criticized the “State’s reliance on his admissions [at the time
of the accident and to other persons] that he was the driver of the motorcycle,
arguing that admissions do not fill a void in the burden of proof.” And he argued
that Eagan stood “for the proposition that if the accused is the sole witness to a
crime, his testimony cannot be automatically rejected.”282
The court recognized Glazier’s Eagan argument, but found that “appellant’s
testimony was not automatically rejected, rather his version of the events was
presented to the court and weighed along with other evidence presented.”283 The
court further noted that Glazier’s “credibility was an issue in that the claim that [the
victim] was driving was not totally consistent with the facts and circumstances and
was impeached on cross-examination.”284 Ultimately, “[g]iven the inconclusive
arguments of [Glazier], the contradicting admissions, and physical facts of the
incident, there was evidence sufficient for the district court to find that [Glazier]
was the driver of the motorcycle at the time of the wreck.”285

18. Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1999)
A jury convicted Griswold of ten counts of second-degree sexual assault on
his seven-year old foster daughters, receiving five concurrent life terms to serve
consecutive with five other concurrent life terms for his actions.286 Part of the
evidence against him relied on the testimony of the minor victims, who testified
278

Id.

279

Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1201–02 (Wyo. 1992).

280

Id. at 1202.

281

Id. at 1203.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

Id.

285

Id. at 1204.

286

Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 924 (Wyo. 1999).
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against him. Griswold claimed that Eagan “mandates reversal and a remand to
the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal” because one
of the victims initially stated “no” when asked “whether Griswold touched her
vagina with his penis.”287 The court declined to entertain Griswold’s contention,
given that the victim was “not the defendant” and the two victims and Griswold
“testified and therefore he was not the sole witness.”288 This was the second case I
found wherein a death had not occurred and the Eagan rule was still requested.

19. Wilks v. State, 49 P.3d 975 (Wyo. 2002)
A jury convicted Wilks of second-degree murder for the shooting of a Pizza
Hut delivery woman (allegedly over a cheap tip).289 Wilks claimed in his statement
to the police that he planned to commit suicide in a hotel but could not afford
the room.290 He then ordered a pizza as his last meal, and shot the delivery person
during an argument about his thrifty tip.291 Wilks claimed that “the jury should
have accepted his version that he did not intend for the events to occur as they
did” in accordance with the Eagan rule.292 The court noted Doe v. State provided
that when the Eagan rule applies, “the defendant’s version of a homicide must
be accepted even in the face of a jury verdict to the contrary.”293 Yet, because
Wilks never made an Eagan rule request, the court would “not consider a claim of
error based upon the Eagan rule.”294 Additionally, the court concluded that Wilks’
version of events amply supported his second-degree conviction because of his
purposeful actions.295

20. Butcher v. State, 123 P.3d 543 (Wyo. 2005)
A jury convicted Butcher of second-degree murder after he stabbed the victim
in a parking lot with a knife.296 Butcher claimed he stabbed the victim in selfdefense, after testimony demonstrated he garnered the knife and asked a friend
whether the victim had raped a friend of his.297 Butcher requested the court apply
the Eagan rule, but it declined for several reasons.298 First, Butcher never requested
287

Id. at 928.

288

Id.

289

Wilks v. State, 49 P.3d 975, 980–81 (Wyo. 2002).

290

Id.

291

Id. at 981.

292

Id. at 990.

293

Id. at 990–91 (quoting Doe v. State, 569 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Wyo. 1977)).

294

Id. at 991 (citing Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Wyo. 1986)).

295

Id.

296

Butcher v. State, 123 P.3d 543, 546–47 (Wyo. 2005).
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Id.

298

Id. at 551.
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an Eagan instruction during trial and second, “other witnesses testified as to the
immediate events leading up to the killing, leaving the appellant’s credibility far
from unscathed and his testimony improbable.”299 The court then noted:
The purpose of the Eagan Rule is to prevent the arbitrary
rejection of a defendant’s testimony where he or she is the only
witness to the crime, where his or her credibility has not been
impeached, and where his or her story is reasonably consistent
with the known facts and circumstances. Nearly the opposite
situation exists here . . . .300

21. Jones v. State, 228 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 2010)
A jury convicted Jones of second-degree sexual abuse of a child and sentenced
him to a five to fifteen year term.301 Jones argued that the trial court should have
applied the Eagan rule to his case in “evaluating the adequacy of the State’s
evidence” upon a motion for judgment of acquittal.302 The Wyoming Supreme
Court rightly concluded that Jones never testified and that one of the prerequisites
to the application of the Eagan rule is that the defendant must testify.303 The
court noted, “[i]n this case, Jones did not testify and, therefore, there was no
testimony given by him that the district court, or for that matter the jury, could
accept or reject.”304 Furthermore, the court noted that Jones’ defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to request “a jury instruction incorporating the Eagan
Rule” because “the Eagan Rule was not applicable under the facts of the case,
and consequently, an Eagan instruction would not have been appropriate even
if counsel had requested that one be given.”305 This was the third case I found
requesting the Eagan rule without a death occurring.

22. Benjamin v. State, 264 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2011)
A jury convicted Benjamin of second-degree murder after she shot and
killed her husband in her trailer.306 She claimed that she shot her husband in
self-defense, although the evidence contradicted her story.307 She requested an
Eagan Instruction, but the trial court declined to provide that instruction.308

299

Id.

300

Id.
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Jones v. State, 228 P.3d 867, 868 (Wyo. 2010).
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Id. at 870.
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Id. at 873–74.
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Benjamin v. State, 264 P.3d 1, 4–6 (Wyo. 2011)
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While Benjamin was the only witness to the crime, the State argued that
forensic evidence impeached her testimony, and the Wyoming Supreme Court
agreed.309 Because Benjamin’s statements were not consistent with the facts and
circumstances surrounding the event, the court held that the Eagan rule did not
apply to her testimony, and the trial court did not err.310

308

Id. at 7–8.

309

Id. at 8–9.

310

Id.
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